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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs.-
ALBERT ROSS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
IN 'IHE SUPREME OOURT 
OF 'IHE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
) Gase No. 14624 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF 'IBE KIND OF CASE 
'Ihe appellant, Albert Ross, was convicted before the 
Second Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, State of 
Utah, of the crime of Distribution of a Controlled Substance for 
Value in violation of Utah Code Ann., 58-37-8 ( 1953) • 'Ihe 
Honorable Ronald o. Hyde, Judge, presided. From that judgment of convic-
tion the defendant brings this direct appeal. 
DISroSITION IN 'IHE LOWER COURT 
'Ihe jury impaneled in the matter found the defendant 
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guilty of the crime of Distribution of a Controlled Substance for 
Value. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced appellant to serve 
an indeterminate sentence in the Utah State Prison of from one to 
fifteen years, as provided by law. 
STATEMENT OF FAC'IS 
On December 9, 1975, at approximately 3:15 p.m., one 
Kenneth Goode, an undercover narcotics operative for the Ogden 
City Police, entered a residence located at 823 West Ellis Street, 
Ogden, Utah, for the purpose of making an alleged "controlled 
buy" of narcotics with money furnished him by the Ogden City 
Police. ('Ir. 5-6, 12, 31). 
At trial in this matter, the only testimonial evidence 
a,4duced by the State of Utah with respect to what transpired within said 
residence was furnished by Mr· Goode. Briefly, Mr· Goode's uncor-
roborated testimony was that, upon entering said residence, he en-
countered appellant and one Fred Ea.ton. After some brief preliminary 
conversation with defendant regarding the proposed buy, Mr· Goode 
testified that he gave Mr· Eaton $200.00 and received eight "ballons" 
of a substance identified at trial as Heroin ('Ir• 6}-65)• No one 
other than Mr· Goode observed the alleged transaction nor even saw 
the defendant. ('Ir· 25, 40). None of the money employed to make the 
-2-
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alleged' b:•/ was ever recovered from defendant and defendant was not ar-
rested nor charged in the matter until some two weeks later on 
December 23, 1975• 
From the testimony of the undercover operative, Mr. Goode, 
it was clearly established that the State's chief witness, 
was a twice convicted felon ('Ir. 5,8-9,i2,57, R· 76);a "former" 
heroin addict who was, at the time of the alleged buy, under the 
influence of Methadone,a Class "A" narcotic (Tr· 5, 8-9, 10,21, 
31, 4-0, 56, R· 76); a thief with two pending felony charges of 
Possession with Intent to Distribute for Value and Burglary arising 
out of an enormous recent burglary of a local drug store in Washington 
Terrace, Utah ('Ir· 21-22, 27, 32, 89); a "former" dealer in 
controlled substances ('Ir. 32) who had sold drugs in substantial 
quantity on numerous occasions and was widely regarded as "one 
of the biggest suppliers in Ogden" (Tr. 105)~ who had apparently re-
ceived or was to receive some substantial consideration in exchange 
for his testimony in this and related cases in the Ogden area ('lr• 
8-9, 12, 10-12, 21-23, 32-33, 82, 92, 118-122), and who, at one 
juncture during questioning at trial, found it necessary to invoke 
his privilege against self-incrimination ('Ir• 71)• 
Upon trial, in the matter, subsequent to both parties having 
rested their respective cases, the jury retired to consider the matter. 
Upon deliberatior., the jury returned a verdict against defendant-
appellant of Guilty of Distribution for Value of a Controlled Substance, 
and judgment and sentence 1>-·:,i_ duly entered by the trial court accordingly 
(Tr, 162-166, R. 86). From that verdict and judgment the defendant-
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
appellant brings this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
FOINT I 
'IHE EVIllENCE PRESENTED AT 'll!IAL IN 'IHIS MA TIER WAS 
UI;ALLY INSUFFICIENT 10 SUFFORT DEFENDANT'S CXlNVICTION 
It is well established as a matter of law that, in a criminal 
prosecution> the State must establish beyond all reasonable doubt all 
of the elements of the offense charged, and that in the absence of such 
degree of proof the defendant is entitled to acquittal. Holt v. 
United States, 218 U.S. 245, 54 L. Etl. 1021, 31 s. Ct. 2 ); 
State V• Allgood, 28 Utah 2d 119, ~9 p. 2d 269 (1972); State V• 
Shonka, 3 Utah 2d 124, 279 p. 2d 711 (1955); State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 
2d 110, 307 p. 2d 212 (1957); State V• Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350 
p. 2d 146 (1960). It is further well established that the Supreme 
Court, in reviewing the legal sufficientcy of the evidence submitted 
to the trier of fact, may set aside a verdict of guilty where the 
evidence was so inconclusive and unsatisfactory that reasonable men 
could and should have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime charged. (State v. Allgood, supra; State v. 
Shonka, supra; State v. Sullivan, supra; State v. Danks, supra.) 
In State v. Sullivan, supra, Mr· Justice Crockett, speaking 
for the Court, enunciated fully the above standard 1 
-4-
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wrote: 
The presumption of innocence and the 
requirement of proof of guilt beyond any 
reasonable doubt, are indeed of the utmost 
importance as safeguards against the poss-
ibility of convicting the innocent. We 
scrupulously adhere to them notwithstanding 
the difficulties encountered and the poss-
ibility that some guilty may escape pun-
ishment. It is an ancient and honored 
adage of our law that it is better that ten 
guilty go free than that one innocent per-
son be punished· We appreciate the wisdom 
of that maxim and the importance of 
according every proper consideration to 
those accused of crime • • • 
Before a verdict may properly be set 
aside, it must appear that the evidence was 
so inconclusive or unsatisfactory that 
reasonable minds acting fairly upon it must 
have entertained reasonable doubt that de-
fendants committed the crime. Unless the 
evidence compels such conclusion as a 
matter of law, the verdict must s.tand. 
(6 Utah 2d PP• 113-114). 
Simila:dy, in State v. Danks, supra, Mr· Justice Callister 
Before setting aside a jury verdict it 
must appear that the evidence was so incon-
clusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable 
minds acting fairly upon it must have enter-
tained reasonable doubt that defendant committed 
the crime. (10 Utah at 164). 
This court has also stated: 
If the State ~s evidence is so inherently 
improbable as to be unworthy of belief, so that 
upon objective analysis it appears that rea-
sonable minds could not believe beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was guilty, the jury's 
verdict cannot stand. Conversely, if the State's 
-5-
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evidence is such that reasonable minds could 
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was guilty, the verdict must be 
sustained. State v. Mills, 122 Utah 306, 
249 P. 2d 211 (1952). (See also State v. 
Horne, 12 Utah 2d 162, 364 p. 2d 109 (1961) 
for the same rule). 
Finally, in what appear to be some what variant 
statements of essentially the same principle enunciated in the above 
cited cases, this Court has said that a jury verdict of guilty 
may be set aside when "taking the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the verdict," the ''findings are unreasonable." State v. 
Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 p. 2d 183 (1960). Alternatively, if 
the verdict is "supported by sufficient competentevidence" a new 
trial is to be denied. State V• Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 355 p. 2d 
689 (1960). See also State V• Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 p. 2d 246 
(1970) for the rule that there must be a ''reasonable basis" for the 
verdict. 
It is apparent from these various statements of the law 
that this court dcY. clearly have the power to reverse and remand in 
an appropriate case and to direct that a new trial be had• 
This court has said that: 
We are not unmindful of the settled rule that 
it is the province of the jury to weigh the testi-
mony and determine the facts. Nevertheless, we 
cannot escape the responsibility of judgment upon 
whether under the evidence, a jury could, in reason, 
conclude that the defendant's guilt was proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Williams, 111 
-6-
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Utah 379, 180 P. 2d 551, 555 (1947)• 
Applying the above cited cases and authority to 
the facts in the instant case, it is clear that the evidence pre-
sented herein was so inconclusive and unsatisfactory that the txier 
of fact must and should have entertained reasonable doubt with re-
spect to defendant's guilt. 
As previously noted in Appellant's Statement of Facts, 
supra, the State's case against defendant is predicated solely upon 
the testimony of one Ken Goode, an undercover operative for the Ogden 
City Police. Only Ken Goode witnessed the alleged txansaction that was 
the basis of the State's case and only Ken Goode identified the 
defendant as one of the individuals purportedly involved in such 
transaction. (Tr. 25, 40). 'lhe State's case is founded entirely 
upon his testimony and his testimony alone. 
As regards Ken Goode, the record in this matter clearly 
discloses that he is a twice convicted felon (Tr. 5, 8-9, 12, 57, 
R. 76), that at the time of his testimony herein there were pending 
against him two felony charges of Possession With Intent to :Jistxi-
bute for Value and Burglary (Tr. 21-22, 27, 32, 89), that he was a 
"former" dealer in contxolled substances who was widely regarded as 
one of the biggest suppliers in the Ogden area, that he had appear-
ently received or was about to receive some substantial consideration 
in exchange for his testimony in this and related cases (Tr. 8-9, 
-7-
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12, 10-12, 21-23, )2-.)), 82, 92, 118-122). 
Appellant does not contend, nor would appellant be so naive 
as to contend, that Ken Goode was not a competent witness to testify 
in the trial proceedings. (See in this regard Utah Code Annotated 
78-24-1 (195'.3) and the cases and authority cited to thereafter). 
Appellant only contends that when this court has had an opportunity to 
review the uncorroborated and unsubsta.tiated testimony of such witness, 
with attention to all of the above mentioned matters of record with 
respect to such witnessej· character, ba.c~und and apparent and obvious 
..--, 
motives to fabricate, that this court will conclude that said witnesse~-; 
testimony was thoroughly impeached and unworthy of belief and that the 
trier of fact, upon the "reasonable man" standard set forth _in the above-
cited cases, must and should have entertained reasonable doubt that 
defendant committed the c:rime charged. 
CONCLIBION 
'!he verdict of gu11 ty in the instant case was clearly 
not supported by the believable evidence. '!his court should reverse 
the verdict and judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for 
a new trial. 
-8-
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CERTIFI.CATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
was duly served on counsel for the respondent, Robert B· Hanson, 
Utah State Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, by hand delivering three (3) copies thereof this 
.lJ~ day of May, 1977• 
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